Форум » Специализированный флот » Vetting Inspection » Ответить

Vetting Inspection

Stinger: Предлагаю в этой теме начинающим танкеристам и готовящимся подняться на заветную старпомовскую должность, ума-разума набираться, а матёрым топам делиться приобретённым жизненным опытом.У соседей такая тема есть. Чем мы хуже? Все вопросы по веттингам сюда.

Ответов - 193, стр: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 All

illi4: Stinger пишет: Забить данные так, чтобы получить максимальную площадь свободной поверхности? Подобного делать не приходилось. Может потому, что на таких судах быть не приходилось. Просто тест лодикатора при нескольких инспекторах делал и всё.

Stinger: По новым требованиям грузовую линию проверяют 100% рабочего давления ежегодно, и 150% отрабочего 1 раз в 30 месяцев. Коррект?

illi4: Stinger пишет: По новым требованиям грузовую линию проверяют 100% рабочего давления ежегодно При тестах следую политике компании - ежегодно на 150% от рабочего. По американскому CFR тоже помойму требование на 150%. С ув.

illi4: SIRE VIQ: Cargo pipelines should be tested to 100% of their rated working pressure (Sometimes referred to as Maximum Allowable Working Pressure - MAWP) at least annually. Cargo pipelines should be tested to 1.5 times their rated working pressure at least twice within any five-year period. Pipelines should be marked with the date of test and the test pressure. Но повторюсь ещё раз - тестим по политике компании, так что в разрез с VIQ не идёт.

chief_engineer: VIQ_Combined_Master_Rev_2_Jan_2012

weser: Господа-есть ли у кого аккаунт на сайте ocimf(может кто-то имеет)?поделитесь пожайлуста...нужна инфо по одному судну...


cyxapb: Да уже пришел такой циркуляр на судно..

k®о$аv4?g: cyxapb пишет: Да уже пришел такой циркуляр на судно.. И не только к вам на судно

chief_engineer: Прошли сегодня Phillips66 (ex: Conoco Phillips). 2 замечания всего, в машине ни одного.

illi4: chief_engineer какие 2 замечания, уточните пожалуйста?

chief_engineer: illi4 Одно замечание за пожарный клапан на палубе, хреново ходил,инспектор его с трудом открыл. Второе замечание за температурные сенсоры по SAAB RADAR системе.

illi4: chief_engineer спасибо за информацию. Многие ветинги любят эти самые пожарные клапана. У меня один супер хотел чтобы они чуть ли не на ветру сами крутились.

illi4: There are many records in the Garbage Record Book about disposal of the Category 3 garbage. Noted that vessel is not fitted with equipment ( grinder or comminuter ) to produce Category 3 Garbage.

cyxapb: Вот такое было замечание, но это для 2-х помощников Just to share an interesting case which was questioned by a CDI inspector to an OOW during a recent inspection: do you know the position of the echo sounder on board your vessel. The position of the echo sounder is quite important for the under keel clearance of a vessel. If the sensor is positioned forward on the vessel this will give an incorrect reading of the echo sounder when the vessel has a trim by the stern. In some cases this might even be a difference of 2 meter or more… important to take into account when calculating your UKC! Do you know it for your vessel….

wartist: The position of the echo sounder is quite important for the under keel clearance of a vessel. If the sensor is positioned forward on the vessel this will give an incorrect reading of the echo sounder when the vessel has a trim by the stern. In some cases this might even be a difference of 2 meter or more… important to take into account when calculating your UKC! Что в принципе логично...У нас например два сенсора на баке и корме...

wartist: wartist пишет: Stinger пишет: цитата: По новым требованиям грузовую линию проверяют 100% рабочего давления ежегодно При тестах следую политике компании - ежегодно на 150% от рабочего. По американскому CFR тоже помойму требование на 150%. С ув. Пришло разъяснение с компании по поводу тестов грузовых\бункерных магистралей----несмотря на политику компании,( где тоже прописано ежегодно)- тестировать ежегодно 100% и ВНИМАНИЕ -150% от рабочего - В ДОКЕ.(и тут я еще больше запутался- ведь док то раз в 5 лет)

wartist: Интересное, но не новое, замечание по поводу W&R- инспектор SHELL- проверил W&R у старпома и Enclosed space permits, где было указано что он лазил в танк, а в W&R указан отдых... Господа- липа должна быть дубовой!

wartist: Observation 1) Nautical charts or publications not corrected up to date . 2) Deck scupper not tight . 3) Oil soaked lagging in the machinery spaces . 4) Oil leaks on the deck hydraulic machinery . 5) Oil or water leaks in the machinery spaces . 6) Hot work commenced before receipt of VSG approval to start hot work. 7) No entry in the deck log of Master taking over or relinquishing the con . 8) Cargo OOW lack of familiarity in operation+ calibration of gas detection equip. 9 ) Cargo OOW showed lack of familiarity with contents of the ship's Stability Book and operating criteria . 10) Engine room skylight left open . 11) Indications of earth fault on switchboard panels in ECR , low insulation readings . 12) Priming pumps on the fire / GS and bilge/ballast pumps seized , not working . 13) Winch clutch lever security pins not being used . 14) Gangway watchman not asking the three basic questions in the right order : a, who are you ? b , what is the purpose of your visit ? c , pls show me ID . 15) Annual summary of NTM's for 2008 not on board . 16) Flashlight in use by gangway watchman or any of the deck watch not intrinsically safe . 17) Strong vacuum in the Accommodation as A/C ventilation not properly set. 18) Enclosed Space Entry Permits : Log of Repetitive checks not filled in . Or did not indicate the O2 , LEL , and toxic gas content . 19) Mechanical vents on deck found seized . 20) Funnel flaps found seized . 21) Some light fittings in the Pump room not working . 22) Chief Engineer's or Chief Officers standing orders in ECR / CCR not signed by relevant Officers. 23) Engineers not aware of any testing procedure for the HP Fuel Leakage Alarm on the Generators . 24) 3rd Officer not able to demonstrate operation of lifeboat air bottles . 25) The Chief Officer did not have a cargo discharge plan prepared . 26 ) The cargo discharge plan did not contain sufficient narrative on the various sequences of the cargo discharge operation. 27) Incorrect entries in the Oil Record Book , either part I or II . 28) Correction fluid used in the ship's official records , such as ORB , cargo log , engine log , etc . 29) Gangway Notice had not been displayed . 30) Mooring winch brake holding capacity not set at the recommended level of 60 pct of the mooring wire breaking loads . 31) Curtains fitted to side and aft windows on the navigation bridge . 32 ) Personal gas detector not worn by staff entering the cargo pump room . 33) Plastic cans provided in the Accommodation for garbage disposal. 34 ) Officers Flag state License or CRA not received , or already expired . 35) Passage plan did not contain calculation of air draft , if vessel had to pass under a bridge . 36) Fire hydrant leaking , or fire hydrant nuts corroded . 37) No written instruction by the C/E for Engine Officers to call the OOW on the Bridge before operating in UMS mode . 38) BA Chart catalogue NP 131 was old (2008) edition . 39) Arrival + sailing drafts not recorded in the Deck log . 40) Change of navigation watch checklists not always completed . 41) Alterations of course omitted from the Deck log . 42 ) C/E not using Permit to Work for Electrical Circuits . 43) Full flow PV Valves were lashed in closed position ( to prevent noise ) . 44) Mooring tail certificates did not indicate to which wire they were fitted . 45) Offshore manifold pressure gauges were closed + covered with canvas bags . 46) Compass errors not being recorded every watch , as required by Master's Standing Orders . 47) Anchor chain quick release bitter ends obstructed by empty oil drums . 48) GMDSS Log did not contain any entries for receipt of weather reports and navigational warnings . 49) Work + Rest hour records not available not correct or not as required . 50) Safety Checklist prior to COW operations not completed . 51) PMS not up to date, number of jobs overdue. 52) Navigational warnings not received regularly and filed incorrectly, not considered in the passage plan. 53) Emergency bilge suction valve in ER not tagged as appropriate. 54) Mooring wires, ropes, tails are in bad condition. 55) Mooring tails of more than 18 months old. 56) LRIT certificate issued by Flag state not available on board. 57) Emergency generator fuel tank not contain enough fuel to run generator at emergency for minimum of 18 hours. 58) Radar performance records not as required (should be graphical or numerical, and not OK or GOOD) 59) IG O2 analyzer not calibrated immediately before start of IG. 60) No records made in ER log about soot blowing of boilers. 61) In case of one of lifeboat designated as rescue boat, recovery straps/pennants provided, to assist recovery in poor weather. 62) Should be one bilge suction valve open at all times, in case of flooding. 63) Forecastle space educator valve, should be tagged only with plastic tie and not padlocked. To be marked “Only to be operated after Chief Officer permission” 64) Extension hose for toxic gas pump was not on board. 65) As per VMS interval for inspection of cargo tanks 12 months, overdue for 6 months or more. 66) The steering gear emergency oil tank was found to be only approx 30% full. C/E advised that normal level required was 80%. Tank was topped up prior to departure of inspector. 67) Cargo tanks were fitted with pressure sensors with remote readout in CCR. It was noted that the readings on 9 of the 14 tanks were incorrect. I.E. Actual tank pressure was 65 mb. Tank readings were: 1P -7mb, 2P 219mb, 2S 173mb, 3S 127mb, 4P, 196mb, 4S 189mb, 5P 182mb, 6S 101mb, S.Slop 105mb. 68) The vessel had sufficient span gas for calibration of the fixed and portable instruments, however one bottle of H2S 25 ppm calibration gas, in inventory, had expired Jun 2010. 69) The vessel had a sufficient supply of Draeger tubes available for toxic gas detection, however one box of H2S Draeger tubes, in inventory, had expired May 2010. 70) The Oil Record Book, part II, had no "M" entry on 25 Jun 2010 to document the failure of the ODME. The required precautions that were taken after the failure were properly documented as an "O" entry. 71) The individual tank high pressure alarms were set at +1200mm in conjunction with p/v valves that vented at +1400 mm. The alarms are required to be set at a value 10% higher than the p/v venting pressure. 72) The oxygen content meter, on the bridge inert gas alarm panel, was not operating. 73) There was a wire sling, in inventory, in the port dog house with no identification markings, homemade splices on each end and numerous broken strands. 74) The electric control boxes, located in the purifier room, for the #1 HFO purifier and the AE LO purifier, had the doors tied open and temporary electric cooling fans rigged to blow on them. 75) There was an electric junction box, which had been pulled from it's mounting bracket, hanging by a wire on the starboard stores crane. 76) The latest in force list of navigational warnings for the passage area was dated 17th May, 2010 and was more than one week old. There was no evidence of effective control of the latest navigational warnings via the EGC/NAVTEX systems for the passage area or the area the vessel was about to transit. 77) The NAVAREA file containing warnings and summaries issued in Notices to Mariners was not in effective use. Warnings were not being extracted to the individual NAVAREA sections but were maintained collectively at the front of the file. In order to locate a particular warning, each NTM would have to be checked. It was noted that extractions had been carried out earlier in the year but the practice had stopped. 78) The helicopter landing area was not marked with the ships' name 79) Reducers had been fitted for a previous operation on two of the offside (starboard) manifolds. All of the bolts securing the blanks were too short. All of them were recessed in the nuts rather than fully penetrating. 80) Moderate hard rust noted on most of the U bolts fitted on cargo lines, at numbers of places on tank washing line. Distance bolts fitted on main common cargo line expansion bellows at three places were noted corroded and wasted. 81)Tanks cleaning heater was not isolated from cargo tanks washing line. 82) 2 NCR issued during the last internal audit on 24 Jul 2010 have not been closed out to date. 83) Near miss reporting system was not effective on board. Only two near miss were reported during the current year I.E on 23 Feb 2010 and 22 Aug 2010. 84) Three fire hydrant aft of the accommodation was observed leaking. (same were rectified before the inspector departure). 85) It was observed that the cargo log did not contain details like time ballast and cargo Tanks worked for current discharging operation. 86) Welding cable was repaired (Joined) with insulation tape at one place. (Rectified ). 87) No records for the periodical survey of the bow chain stopper, associated foundation and supporting structure was available onboard, which should be carried out at least once every 5 years. Vessel was fitted with 1X200 T bow stopper. 88) SWL marking on the bow chain stopper was not done with weld bead out line. Rest of the mooring equipment were marked with weld bead outline. 89) Lifeboats were last launched on 24 April 2010 90) The flashlight was missing at one fireman's outfits in the main deck store 91) On the main deck winches there were several grease nipples which were over-painted. On at least two winches the hydraulic supply valve hand wheel had wasted away so the valve could not be moved if required. 92) Fixed piping system for the oxygen and acetylene in engine room workshop connection by pipe flange and not welded construction. 93) Port slop cargo tank’s pressure indicator not working. Also 4P and 2S cargo tanks level indicators were indicated fault in the display panel. There was no closed device for monitoring of cargo tank atmosphere condition. Rag was used to prevent gas out of the dipping connection when monitoring 4P cargo tank oxygen reading with portable oxygen meter. 94) Cargo tank P/V valve working pressure = +2000 / -700 mmwg, but the alarm setting was +1540 mmwg for the pressure side. Cargo tank fitted with individual full flow high velocity P/V valve pressure indicator with audio / visual alarms in cargo control room and common mast riser. 95) Dedicated heavy ballast tank No. 4 C was only bottom washed during last cow operation. 96) Mandal connection was not correctly fitted; mooring ropes were on the roller end of the connection link. 97) Main engine fuel oil system safety relief valve connection leaking and insulation lagging was oil soaked. One of the adjacent fuel valve glands with sign of leaking and insulation lagging was also oil soaked. 98) Plastic button of one breathing apparatus mask regulator was found broken. Regulator was tested during the inspection and it was working in good condition 99) Indication of open/close position in the computer for drop valve of cargo tank 1 S and 5 valves of Ballast system were not working. Forward draft indication on the computer was found out of order. 100) #2MCP had a homemade cover around the pumps lower bearing and there was some VGO oil dripping on the deck under the pump. Could not see what was behind the cover. Since the pump was running the Chief Mate could not remove the cover. 101) In cargo valve hydraulic room found two small hydraulic leaks. One on the hydraulic pump system with oil dripping on the deck inside the containment. Also the cargo valve manifold had a small leak with oil on the deck also within the containment. 102) Found 4 lighting mast stays with wire rope clips installed backwards. The vessels crew fixed these prior to the inspector departing the vessel. 103) : Vessel’s SVDR found inoperative due to failure of data transfer cable. Vessel conducted annual class survey 27 August 2010 in Houston and Safety Equipment Certificate could not be endorsed as a result of this failure. 104) One EEBD located in engine has leak at fill valve and has to be refilled with O2 approximately every two to three days. The EEBD has been in this leaking condition since May 2010. 105) Vessel’s only sounding tape (dipping) for cargo measurement was observed being utilized broken with tape disconnected from reel. 106) Senior officers have not had open-water ship to ship transfer experience within the last 12 months. 107) Two of the vessel’s nylon mooring wire tails have not been renewed for over 29 months. 108) It was noted that a fire hose and extinguisher were placed immediately adjacent to the cargo manifold . 109) A fire plan and international connection had been placed on top of the cargo manifold rather than adjacent to the shore gangway which was rigged between the manifold and superstructure. 110) The last 2 entries under Code C 11 were at intervals of 8 days rather than 7 days as requested by MARPOL. 111) As per company’s drug and alcohol policy, all crewmembers should be tested on board (alcohol test) in a two months period, but as per records available on board Master and Chief Engineer were last tested on 04-May-2010 (V.I.Q. 3.11) 112) Wheelhouse poster did not conform to IMO Res. A.601(15) in content: Anchor chain data and ship blind sectors were missing (V.I.Q. 4.7) 113) As per the Master’s Standing Orders, watch officer had to call the Master in case of restricted visibility but it was not defined what was considered restricted visibility (V.I.Q. 4.9) 114) Sailing direction NP-22 (Bay of Biscay) available on board was not the 2010 edition (V.I.Q. 4.16) 115) The number of lifejackets stored in the boxes close to both lifeboats embarkation area was not indicated nearby the IMO symbol. (V.I.Q. 5.57) 116) Paint locker was not fitted with fire detection system and this space was not covered by regular fire patrols (V.I.Q. 5.66) 117) Fire extinguisher not fitted in the electrical equipment room. The closest extinguisher was located in the bridge but it was dry powder type, for fires class A & B, not suitable for electrical fires (V.I.Q. 5.69) 118) Oil Record Book, part 2: Disposal of engine sludge to slop tank was being recorded under code B (corresponding to internal transfer of oil cargo) (V.I.Q. 6.1) 119) Forward draft marks were not clearly indicated (V.I.Q. 12.3) 120) Filling line and vent line of emergency generator fuel tank observed with temporary repairs (bandage) (V.I.Q. 12.6) 121) Air vent located at forecastle locker entrance was not identified the space it served (V.I.Q. 12.10) 122) The starboard lifeboat had been designated as the rescue boat but had not been equipped with the Foul Weather Recovery equipment as required by SOLAS. (Recovery strops and hanging off pendants.) 123) When checked the records indicated that the cargo pipelines had been annually pressure tested to L5 MAWP (this despite 1.5 times MAWP being required only twice within five year period by OCIMF) to a pressure of 16 bar. This pressure had. it was reported, been reached by using positive displacement stripping pump. The inspector considered that such method could endanger the pipeline system by over-pressurization by use of stripping pump. 124) The vessel, when departing Suez Canal, had exited into buoyed channel at 3l degrees 14 minutes North and u'as still in the area bounded by breakwaters to the North of Port Said. The vessel then proceeded in the very narrow buoyed channel during which time the positions plotted were solely from GPS. At no time in the buoyed channel did 1he OOW plot a visual, radar or monitoring position. 125) Small gear, including a fire axe, was unlashed and free to move within the lifeboats. 126) The port lifeboat painter eye splice (connecting painter to boat) was badly perished and in a dangerous condition. Master had new painter fitted immediatelv ) 127)The emergency generator fuel oil savall had not deployed the savall plug. Further, the Savall had no marking stating that it was for the emergency generator. 128) The IG log records were referenced during current discharge and it was noted that normally the IG oxygen level was 4.1%o to 4.5o/o, however, the entries at 1300 and 1400 were 5.6%o and 5.3 % respectively. At this time the vessel was still discharging cargo and did not stop till shore tank change at 1440. 129) The fire hoses in the engine room were measured at 20 meters in length when SOLAS required that engine room fire hoses should not exceed l5 meters in length. 130) The drain water pipe line in the starboard side of engine room was leaking rusty water and was soft patched in several areas. Может поможет!


полная версия страницы